Proposed definition. In this section, the modified axioms will be presented and these will be compared with the axioms in [l ] and [2] . If N is an n element set, EN will represent an «-dimensional Euclidean space with coordinates indexed by elements in N. The components of payoff vector xEEN will be indexed with superscripts (x1, • ■ • , x") and x = s y for SEN will mean x'Sïy* for iES. Intuitively, H will be the convex hull of the finite set of possible game outcomes and v(S) will designate the set of payoff vectors x for which the coalition S can, in some sense, effectively obtain at least x* for each iES.
Definition.
A game is a triple (N, v, H), where A is a finite set, if is a compact polyhedral subset of EN, and v is a function that carries each subset 5 of A into a subset v(S) of EN so that:
v(S) is closed;
2. v(S) is convex; 3. v is a comprehensive, i.e. xEv(S) and y^s x imply yEv(S); 4. v is super-additive, i.e. Sxr\S2 = 0 implies v(Sx^JS2)Dv(Sx) nv(S2); 5. v is proper, i.e. v(S)¿¿0 for all SCA; 6. xEv(N) if and only if x^y for some yEH.
N is called the set of players and v is called the characteristic func-tion. The intuitive justification of most of these axioms is given in [l] and [2] , Condition (5), the only one which is new here, says that the members of a coalition are guaranteed something just by the play of the game. The "game" in [l ] is the same as our game, except that conditions (5) and (6) are replaced by:
(5') v(0)=E»; (6') HEv(N).
The only difference between the "ordinary game" of [2] and the game here is that the former satisfies (5') instead of (5) .
Observe that the axioms here are stronger than those in [l] and [2] . Conditions (5) and (3) This lemma says that if the members of a coalition can guarantee themselves certain minimal payoffs, there is some payoff vector in H that actually gives them such payoffs. This cannot be proven from the weaker axioms.
Counter examples. A six-person game in the sense of [l] will be given and will be shown to have no solution. Then this example will be modified slightly to become an example of a seven-person ordinary game in the sense of [2] which has no solution. The reader who is unfamiliar with the solution concept is referred to [l-4] . Briefly, the basic definitions are as follows: Note. For each of the three coalitions {l, 2}, {3, 4}, and {5, 6}, there is a point in H lor which the coalition effectively obtains a value of 2 for each of its members; yet there is no point in H where these coalitions obtain these values simultaneously. This is a hopeless violation of super-additivity and the lemma of the last section; a violation which cannot be patched up by changing v outside of H. Thus, this example falls outside the scope of the definition here.
Proof that G has no solution.
1. Point c is in the core because some member of each nonempty set for which c is effective obtains his maximum for points in H.
2. Let Li be the line segment between c and pi. We see that A -Dom c = Lx^JL2\JL3 because H = A and c dominates other points in H via {1, 3, 5}. 3 . We wish to prove that, if V is a solution, then Lii\V= {c}. Observing that G is symmetric under the permutation w= (135)(246), we shall assume without loss of generality that there is a point x^c such that xELxCW. If y£ Fis a point such that y Dom px, it is easily seen that yEL2, y3 = 2>x3 and yi>pt^xi.
Thus, y Dom[3,4)X which is impossible; hence, pxEV. Since piDom¡s,6¡z for z in Lz-{c}, V(~\Ls = {c}. But this means that p2 is undominated by V and hence piE V. But p2 Dom{3,4¡£i and this is the final contradiction which proves (3).
4. (1) says that c must be in any solution V and (2) and (3) say that c must be the only point in V; but we know that {c} is not a solution.
Now for the example which satisfies the definition in [2] . It is obtained from Example 1 by adding a dummy player and changing the characteristic function outside of H; hence the previous proof essentially proves that this also has no solution. Further observations. There are several observations to be made about the definition of a game given here.
1. The von Neumann-Morgenstern theory [5] can be made to fit this framework. Letting v be the classical characteristic function, let viS)={x\ Us max[x\ l({*})jítfCS)}, H={x\ HN x^viN) and *'£»({*}) for iEN}.
2. An alternative definition is to replace condition (5) by:
for all iEN.
Since (5") and (3) imply (5) this yields to an even stronger definition. For the purposes of a solution theory, however, the definitions are equivalent. More precisely, one can show that, given a game 3. Under the definition in this paper, the composition (as defined in [l ]) of games is still a game.
4. The natural definition of an extended game is to take (TV, v, H) satisfying only conditions (1) to (5) . It may be seen that Example 1 provides an unassailable example of an unsolvable extended game. It should be pointed out, however, that contrary to the classical theory, no significant role has yet been found for such extended games.
5. It is now known that conditions (1), (3), (4), (5), and (6) are all necessary if there is to be an existence theorem. In addition to the big question of existence, there is the question as to the importance of the convexity condition.
